University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
History Faculty Publications

History

2005

Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and
Alliance Politics, 1941–1945 (Book Review)
David Brandenberger
University of Richmond, dbranden@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/history-faculty-publications
Part of the History of Religion Commons, Military History Commons, and the Soviet and PostSoviet Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Brandenberger, David. Review of Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945, by Steven Merritt Miner.
Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 3 (2005): 196-97.

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the History at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in History
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Book Reviews
Steven Merritt Miner, Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics,
1941–1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 407 pp. $55.00.
Reviewed by David Brandenberger, University of Richmond
In September 1943, Josef Stalin invited three hierarchs from the Russian Orthodox
Church to the Kremlin to discuss the future of the faith. According to one account,
Metropolitan Sergii was unsure whether to wear church vestments to the meeting and
decided in the end to wear civilian clothes instead. Stalin smiled knowingly upon seeing the future patriarch in such unpretentious attire and gestured toward the ceiling,
commenting, “You’re more afraid of me than you are of him” (Boris Sokolov,
“Dogovor s d’iavolom,” Novoe russkoe slovo, 4 September 2003, p. 6). Even if entirely
apocryphal, this story captures the awkwardness of the meeting quite effectively.
The Kremlin tête-à-tête and the iconoclastic revival of the Russian Orthodox
Church that followed have long intrigued those writing about ideological change in
the USSR under Stalin. Many believe that the concessions to the church were an exigency of war designed to increase the party’s ability to rally support from among even
the most reluctant members of Soviet society. Others consider the revival of the
church to have been part of a more thoroughgoing Russiªcation of the USSR in the
mid- to late 1930s that rehabilitated aspects of the Russian national past for
mobilizational purposes well before 1941. In Stalin’s Holy War, Steven Merritt Miner
proposes to reªne such broad explanations through an analysis of the timing and nature of the church’s wartime resurgence. Noting that the church’s institutional resurrection occurred only in 1943 and that the vast majority of church reopenings occurred in formerly occupied territories in Ukraine and Belorussia, Miner argues that
Russian Orthodoxy played a role that was more imperial and diplomatic than Russian
per se. The church, as in tsarist times, served as an instrument of central control, helping the USSR consolidate gains made against the Germans after the victory at Stalingrad. As the Red Army reclaimed territory, Ukrainian and Belorussian parishes that
had been reopened under the Nazis were turned over to the Moscow patriarchate in
order to rein in communities that had been wrenched from the Soviet orbit in 1941.
An institution of imperial administration, the church also took part in a diplomatic offensive launched at about the same time. This campaign used the church to
court public opinion in the United States and Britain, reassuring the USSR’s erstwhile
allies that Soviet society was not as militantly atheistic as many believed. Intriguingly,
the massive publishing effort surrounding the church’s revival appears to have been intended chieºy for foreign consumption in order to assuage fears that the Red Army’s
advance into Europe would serve purely Communist objectives.
Miner is wise to draw attention to the revival of church institutions in 1943
and persuasively demonstrates that their bureaucratic power was harnessed to aid the
Soviet cause in the former borderlands and abroad in the years thereafter. Somewhat
less convincing is Miner’s tendency to downplay the role that the church played in domestic mobilizational efforts earlier in the war (pp. 6–11, 78–83, etc.). Recent research on the wane of anti-religious campaigns during the interwar period indicates
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that the gradual rehabilitation of the church began as early as the mid-to-late 1930s
(see S. V. Bakhrushin’s groundbreaking “K voprosu o kreshchenii Rusi,” IstorikMarksist, No. 2 [1937], pp. 40–77). This revival accelerated after the start of the Nazi
invasion in 1941 when religious vocabulary (e.g., “Holy War”) became a central element of Soviet mass culture, appearing everywhere from popular song books to the
front page of Pravda. Intended to harness religious feelings among ordinary Russians
on the home front, this imagery—along with a greater tolerance for religion itself—
should be seen as part of a populist line designed to cultivate dormant Russian patriotic sentiments in the name of national defense.
As Soviet fortunes improved in early 1943, ofªcial priorities shifted from popular
mobilization to the restoration of centralized, bureaucratic control. Miner’s work
reºects this shift, insofar as it focuses more on the institutional history of the Russian
Orthodox Church at war than it does on the Soviet co-option of popular religiosity or
Russian national iconography. Ultimately, Stalin’s Holy War complements our understanding of how the church helped mobilize the Russian home front with insightful
analysis on how it served as a tool of Soviet inºuence both in Eastern Europe and
beyond.
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